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THECURRENCY RATIO
IF BANKS maintain fractional reserve ratios and convert deposits into
currency upon request, as in the U.S. monetary system, the currency
ratio affects the distribution of high-powered money between banks
and the public and thereby helps to determine the quantity of deposits
created.Except when banks suspend payments, free convertibility
allows the public to maintain any ratio up to unity, and
desired changes can be and usually are made quickly. In the United
States, for the period of this study, all high-powered money held by
the nonbanking public has been in the form of currency and vice versa;
the two concepts pertain to the same quantity. Under those circum-
stances the currency ratio indicates the distribution of money balances
between deposits and currency and also of high-powered money
between banks and the public, a dual role which greatly simplifies
the analysis.Until 1866, state commercial banks also issued notes,'
clearly not high-powered money by our definition of it as money banks
can use for reserves. In that period, therefore, the fraction of its money
balances the public wanted at any time to hold in the form of gold coin
was also an important determinant of the money stock.In general,
the amounts of gold and of currency held by the public behave dif-
ferently. After the retirement of state bank notes, however, the public's
gold ratio was ordinarily not of great importance. Since 1934 it has
been zero.The public's demand for gold was discussed briefly in
Chapter 3 (under Silver Purchases). The present chapter is concerned
solely with the currency ratio.
A variety of factors appears to influence the demand for currency.
It is not held just to facilitate current transactions. Currency outside
banks per person in the United States averaged $164 in 1955 and $30
in 1929. Multiplying these figures by three or four to put them on a
per-household basis gives an amount that seems far above the average
transactions needs of a typical family.Retail businesses probably
1In1866, a prohibitive federal tax was placed on their issue. By the early 1870's
nearly all had been retired.
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hold but a minor part of the total.Apparently a large amount of
currency is held as a store of wealth, though the nature of such holdings
may have changed over the years.In the mid-1800's, currency was
for many people the sole financial means of holding wealth.Since
then the alternatives have greatly expanded with the growth of time
and savings accounts, deposit insurance, U.S. savings bonds, pension
plans, and so on.Such alternatives may have reduced currency
holdings. To some wealthy individuals, however, currency stored in
a safe deposit box provides secrecy—a special advantage that may have
become more appealing in recent decades as estate and income tax
rates have risen substantially.
The main substitute for currency as a means of payment is a checking
account; and as a store of wealth, probably a savings deposit.As-
suming that individuals account for most currency demand (businesses
temporarily holding only what they take in through retail trade), we
may express the demand in terms of the public's preferences for
currency as a medium of exchange and as a store of wealth. To explain
changes in the amount demanded, two sets of variables are involved,
one for the transactions demand and one for the store-of-wealth
demand. Two important variables in the first set might be the volume
of consumer expenditures and the cost of a checking account; in the
second set they might be total private wealth and the return on a
savings deposit.
Since we are concerned with currency holdings relative to total
money balances, the preceding variables are relevant only to the
extent that they affect the demand for currency and deposits differently.
Changes in the net rate of return on deposits do have differential
effects on currency and deposits by inducing substitutions between
them. Growth in expenditures and wealth may also help explain the
differing growth rates in currency and deposit holdings. The followihg
section on secular movements discusses these developments.Cyclical
movements, taken up in the second section, appear quite different in
nature.
1.SecularMovements in the Demand for Currency
SHIFTS IN THE DEMAND RELATIVE TO OTHER ASSETS
The ratio of currency to the total money stock is affected by shifts
between currency and deposits as well as shifts between either of theseCHART 10
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two and other assets. To help identify the factors affecting currency
demand, Chart 10 presents annual data on the currency-money ratio,
currency-expenditures ratio, and income-money ratio (the familiar
velocity of money, income approximated here by net national product).
The middle ratio uses the annual volume of consumer expenditures as
a scale factor to deflate currency held outside banks. This deflator
serves as a first approximation to all factors associated with long-run
growth in the economy affecting currency, through the transactions
as well as the wealth demand. We cannot distinguish empirically the
effects on currency demand of expenditures and of wealth, since their
long-run movements are so similar.
The currency-money ratio had a downward trend from the l870's
until 1930.It rose appreciably during the early 1930's and \'Vorld
War II. The trend after 1930 appears slightly upward, but in view
of the earlier decline the later period may be interpreted as two sharp
short-run increases superimposed upon a slackening or termination
of the earlier downtrend. The currency-expenditures ratio parallels
these movements, though with a smaller percentage decline during
the pre-1930 period and larger movements in the l930's and 1940's.
The income-money ratio also parallels the pre-1930 decline, but moves
generally opposite to the other two ratios in the latter period.
Some changes in demand affect either the currency-expenditures
ratio or the income-money ratio but not both, producing independent
movements. Thus substitutions between currency and commercial
bank deposits do not involve the total amount of money demanded,
and the effect on the currency-money ratio is entirely reflected in the
currency-expenditures ratio.Substitutions between commercial bank
deposits and other earning assets do not involve currency demand, and
the income-money ratio shows the entire effect on the currency-money
ratio.Certain demand shifts, however, affect both.If both currency
and deposits are substituted for nonmonetary assets, other things the
same, the currency-expenditures ratio rises and the income-money
ratio falls, both reflecting the same shift.2It is not always clear to
2Asa formal expression, the currency-money ratio equals the product of three
other ratios: C CEY
ME Y M'
where the first on the right side is currency C to consumer expenditures E; the second,
consumer expenditures to national income Y; and the third, the income velocity122 THE CURRENCY RATIO
what extent currency demand takes part in such shifts, but the fore-
going ratios suggest the direction of the net changes occurring, as-
suming that consumer expenditures and national income are ap-
propriate scale factors.Declines in both the currency-expenditures
and the money-income ratio point to substitutions of commercial
bank deposits for currency and other assets—deposits are expanding
and currency contracting relative to the scale factors; and conversely
for increases in both ratios. A rise in the currency-expenditures ratio
and decline in the income-money ratio point to gains in currency
holdings at the expense of assets other than commercial bank deposits;
the converse movements point to a shift from currency and perhaps
deposits to other assets.
Chart 10 may thus be interpreted as follows: The decline in all
three ratios up to 1930 suggests a shift in relative demand from currency
and nonmonetary assets to commerical bank deposits. As indicated
by the currency-expenditures ratio, the decline in currency demand
accelerated after about 1904 (disregarding the 1907 panic). Currency
demand rose thereafter, most sharply in response to the banking
crisis of the early 1930's and wartime developments in the 1940's.
The accompanying movements of the income-money ratio in those
decades suggest that the increased demand for currency did not have
neutral effects on the total amount of money demanded, but that
the public shifted from nonmonetary assets to both currency and
of money. Even though the middle ratio on the right may be independent of the others
in the long run, the other two will, as suggested, sometimes be related. Only when all
three on the right move independently can changes in the left side be broken down into
the three separate effects.
An argument that the currency-money ratio depends upon the velocity of money
has been made by Frank Brechling (see "The Public's Preference for Cash," Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 46, Sept. 1958).Brechling assumes that the
demand for currency may be separated into demands for idle and active currency,
and that these are each fractions of the demand for idle (M,) and active (M2) money
balances, respectively. That is, C =cM1+ whence Cf M =(ccM1+ .11M2)/M,
where presumably>c.The currency ratio therefore depends on the distribution
of money between active and idle balances, which may be measured by the velocity
of total money balances.
The empirical implications of this formulation are brought out by assuming that
is virtually zero and that the ratio of active to total money balances is some function
of velocity, f( Y/M).Thenwe have C/M = f( Y/M). If we further assume that
is a function of the ratio of currency to consumer expenditures, we obtain a relationship
similar to the preceding identity.
It is doubtful, however, thatis either small or constant, though it might be reason-
ably constant in the short run.THE CURRENCY RATIO 123
commercial bank deposits. The rise in the income-money ratio during
the 1950's points to the opposite shift.
These secular movements in the relative demand for currency may
be attributed to numerous developments. We may assess the con-
tributions of three factors often cited—the net rate of return on de-
posits, growth in real income and wealth, and urbanization—and
other special factors contributing to the wartime increases.
NET RATE OF RETURN ON DEPOSITS
The rate of interest paid on deposits net of service charges represents
the attractiveness—if the rate is positive—or the cost—if negative—of
holding deposits instead of currency. Do these rates behave in a way
that could explain major movements in currency demand? The
rates on demand and time or savings deposits have behaved differently
and require separate discussion.
Demand Deposits. Although the average rate paid on all demand
deposits was not inconsiderable before such payments were prohibited
for member banks in 1934 and for insured banks in 1935, small ac-
counts, which are the main substitutes for currency, have never earned
interest. Before 1934, banks commonly paid interest on amounts due
to other banks and the U.S. Treasury and on some large holdings of
businesses and individuals.In 1927, for example, when interest
payments on demand deposits were first reported separately, the
average rate paid by member banks was 11 per cent (see Appendix E
for data on rates). When paid, the typical rate was probably around
2 per cent, which implies over one-third of member bank demand
deposits earned no interest.Also, in a special survey of all national
banks made by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1870, one-third of
the banks paid no interest on any deposits.
Service charges were not common in the I920's and earlier, a
reason large city banks and perhaps others typically did not encourage
small checking accounts. When data on charges were first reported
in 1933, those of member banks averaged 15 cents a year per $100 of
demand deposits. Although only small depositors paid such charges,
the typical rate, when charged, was probably well below one-half of
1per cent.Services charges have spread since the 1930's, and by
1960 the average charge, based on all publicly held demand deposits
with insured banks, had risen to nearly one-half of 1 per cent. Federal124 THE CURRENCY RATIO
deposit insurance, introduced in 1934, has lowered losses on small
accounts virtually to zero, but it does not fully compensate for the
charges.3
The rise in service charges after 1933, while moderate, was of some
consequence. The currency-expenditures ratio, as Chart 10 shows,
reached an all-time low in 1929.It declined moderately from its high
point after the 1933 panic4 but then started to rise again. The rise
during World War II reflects special factors and is discussed later.
The decline during the 1950's has erased the wartime rise but, so far,
no more; by 1960 the ratio stood at about the 1939 level and seemed
to be leveling off. The high level in 1939 and 1960 compared with
1929 seems partly to reflect the increase in service charges.
'Whatever its effect later, the rate of return on demand deposits
probably had negligible effect on currency use in the pre-1930 period,
simply because the rate paid on small accounts was constant at zero
and losses were generally low and not alarming, even in panic years.
Savings Deposits. These deposits5 have always paid interest, though
the rate has varied from 5 or 6 per cent in the early 1870's to less than
1 per cent in the 1930's and 1940's. The data for commercial and
mutual savings banks, discussed in Appendix E, indicate that most
rates on these deposits move together. The rates generally fell after
the 1870's until the turn of the century, and rose during the 1920's.
Fragmentary evidence places a long-run trough in these rates in 1904.
After 1930 they fell to the unusually low levels noted, reaching a trough
in the second half of the 1940's.Thereafter there was a sharp rise
continuing through the 1950's (see Chart 18, p. 168).
Insofar as savings deposits substitute for currency as a store of
wealth, fluctuations in these rates produce opposite movements in the
The average annual rate of loss from 1920 to 1929 ran from 9 to 19 cents per siOO
ofdeposits (based on Annual Report, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1940,
p. 66).
The increase in demand for currency from 1929 to 1933 is readily explained by a
sharp rise in actual and expected losses on deposits. The demand shot up much
higher than in previous panics, because the 1933 episode was the culmination of two
years of ruinous bank failures.In earlier panics, suspension of payments usually
came quickly, removing the obligation to pay out currency until the panic passed and
allowing even most weak banks to survive.
The majority of time deposits at commercial banks are small savings accounts of
individuals (see Chap. 5, "Shifts Between Time and Demand Deposits"), similar to
deposits at savings banks.All such substitutes for currency are referred to here as
savings deposits.THE CURRENCY RATIO 125
currency-expenditures ratio.This effect therefore helps explain the
accelerated decline in the ratio from 1904 to 1930, the rise during
the 1930's and 1940's, and the decline thereafter. The secular decline
in the ratio from the 1870's to 1930, however, must reflect other factors,
inasmuch as savings deposit rates fell until the turn of the century
and apparently were higher in the early 1870's than at any time since.
The wartime rise in currency demand seems much too steep to attrib-
ute more than a small part to the decline in these rates. However, they
no doubt contributed, along with the rise in check charges, to the
higher level of the currency-expenditures ratioin1939 than in
1930.
The effect of deposit rates on the currency-money ratio is less certain
because of parallel movements in general interest rates. A rise in
deposit rates, for example, induces shifts from currency to deposits;
but when interest rates at large also rise, the public may at the same
time shift from demand deposits and perhaps time deposits to other
assets, depending upon yield differentials.Parallel movements in the
spectrum of interest rates arc the rule.Although savings deposit
rates move sluggishly, the differential yield on other assets generally
widens iess than the rise in the level of the rates, and narrows less than
the decline. Therefore, shifts between deposits and other assets from
this source, though they tend to moderate the effects of currency
shifts on the currency-money ratio, probably do not reverse them.
For demand deposits, however, which offered a zero return to small
accounts before the l930's and since then have imposed charges largely
unrelated to general interest-rate movements, a rise in interest rates
induces a shift from demand deposits to other assets but not from
currency to demand deposits. With a rise in interest rates, therefore,
the over-all demand for commercial bank deposits might decrease
proportionately more than that for currency, producing a rise in the
currency-money ratio, and conversely with declines in interest rates.
Such opposite movements in the currency-money and currency-
expenditures ratios have generally not occurred, however, suggesting
that the demand for currency has a larger response to changes in
deposit rates than the demand for commercial bank deposits has to
interest-rate movements at large.
In any event, deposit rates partly explain the post-l930 movements
in the currency-money ratio, but not the earlier secular decline.126 THE CURRENCY RATIO
INCOME GROWTH AND URBANIZATION
Although many factors might account for the secular decline in
currency demand, only two seem capable of a sufficiently persistent and
pervasive influence to be important—growth in income and wealth,
and urbanization.Both could affect institutional arrangements for
making payments and holding wealth, and most changes in such
arrangements can be related to one or both of those two developments.
The rise in real income per capita would reduce the relative demand
for currency if it enhanced the appeal of making payments by check
and having a bank account, or, in technical terms, if the income
elasticity of currency were less than unity.This may at first seem
strange, because we customarily associate such a phenomenon with
"necessities."\'Vith higher incomes people switch from them to more
expensive items; similarly, in their portfolios they might forego income
to acquire lower-yielding securitiesthatoffer nonpecuniary ad-
vantages, such as liquidity. From this point of view, we should not be
surprised to find a shift to money balances from higher-yielding assets
when real income rises.But why a shift from currency to deposits?
Before the 1930's, a small checking account cost nothing, and a large
account or a savings deposit paid interest. A shift from currency to
deposits cannot be described as providing an asset with greater con-
venience at the expense of a lower yield. To be sure, some devices for
avoiding currency may cost something (as with credit cards and
checking accounts today), but this qualification is not applicable to
most of the pre-1930 period except to the extent (apparently rare)
that banks required a minimum balance to open a checking account.
The way out is not to argue that the income elasticity of currency
cannot be less than unity but to recognize that income growth is a
proxy for a host of other developments which, on balance, may work
to increase the demand for deposits relative to currency. Rising real
income changes our mode of life and somewhere along the way may
Convert practices of holding wealth and making payments from
currency to deposits.Interrelated as these developments are, it may
still be possible (and if possible, certainly revealing) to separate the
effects on currency demand of some of them, such as urbanization,
from the others, which may then be combined into an all-inclusive
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Urbanization is a favorite explanation of the spread of banking,
and it is tempting to assume that it must also have produced a sub-
stantial reduction in the use of currency.It must be remembered,
however, that this factor works in two directions.First, the impersonal
nature of urban trade discourages the use of checks and credit.His-
torical commentaries suggest that it was once much more common
for laborers to buy on credit between pay periods, at least in small
communities, and to settle their accumulated debts on payday. Pay-
ment of retail purchases in this way would decrease the use of currency.
The growth of Cities may have reduced this practice and so have
increased the use of currency. To be sure, charge accounts are still
widely used even in large cities, but their importance may be less than
it was fifty or seventy-five years ago—the recent proliferation of credit
cards to the contrary notwithstanding.
A second, quite different effect of urbanization on the demand for
currency is sometimes deduced from various facts suggesting that
larger bank deposits are held by individuals in cities than in country
districts. The inference drawn is that urban life provides familiarity
with the advantages of checking accounts and encourages the banking
habit. For example, payment of wages by check is (or once was) more
common in urban than in rural business.Inconveniences of banking
by mail and possible inefficiencies of small banks may also have
limited the spread of banking in rural communities, though only the
most sparsely settled areas would seem to be unable to support one
bank, or at least a branch of a nearby bank. Branch banking is illegal
in many states, but it is questionable whether the prohibition would
have endured if rural communities had demanded banking facilities
that could be supplied economically only by branch banks.
Yet the same can be said of the use of currency. All the preceding
argument says is that rural areas have less demand for all kinds of
money than cities do, or at least until quite recently, because barter
was prevalent in frontier areas and wages were paid partly in kind.
This implies nothing about shifts in demand between currency and
deposits. The question is whether migrants from rural areas to cities
become familiar with banking practices and expand their use of
checking facilities in place of currency.Without evidence, there is
little basis on which to judge.
Combining the second effect of urbanization with the first throws the128 THE CURRENCY RATIO
over-all effect of this variable into doubt. These two supposed effects
of urbanization on currency demand work in opposite directions, and
there is no a priori basis for expecting their net effect to work one way
or the other.
In. an earlier study of mine on currency demand,6 a comparison of
U.S. and British data indicated that urbanization alone might explain
part but not all of the early decline in the currency-money ratio.
Estimates of the British ratio of currency to consumer expenditures
support the same conclusion.The British ratio had a downward
trend from 1883 to1914.While the urbanization movement in
Britain declined sharply after 1900, the ratio fell1percentage point
from 1903 to 1914 (from 7.8 to 6.8 per cent).7 The American ratio fell
2.6 points in that period (from 8.2 to 5.6 per cent, see Table F-18),
suggesting that the larger decline here reflected a combination of
continued urbanization and rising deposit rates.
Whether income growth or urbanization had the greater influence
is relevant to the interpretation of later movements in the ratio. The
urbanization movement declined sharply after the 1920's in the United
States, while the income effect—unless it was merely a proxy for
developmentslikeurbanizationorgeographicalexpansion—has
continued and therefore has influenced the ratio after 1930 as well.
Later movements in the ratio are too volatile to resolve the question.
Although definite conclusions are not possible, we can narrow the
possibilities.If urbanization, or some combination of like factors all
of which diminished after 1930, accounts for the earlier downtrend in
the currency-expenditures ratio, the future trend in the ratio will be
horizontal, once the wartime rise has been fully erased and assuming
no large changes in deposit rates. There is a slight indication that the
ratio was leveling off in 1960 at about the 1938—39 level. On the other
hand, if the ratio continues to decline, a leading explanation would
be the continuing influence of income growth.In either event, we
should explain the higher level in 1939 relative to 1929 by an increase
6TheDemand for Currency Relative to the Total Money Supply, Occasional Paper 62,
New York, NBER, 1958 (originally published without appendix in Journal of Political
Economy, Aug. 1958). The first part of this chapter summarizes and reinterprets the
results of that study.
Currency figures are based on the sources cited for Table 2, ibid.Consumer
expenditures are fromJ. B. Jefferys and D. Walters, "National Income and Expendi-
ture of the United Kingdom 1870—1952," in Income and Wealth, London, International
Association for Research in Income and Wealth, 1955, Table I, pp. 8—9.THE CURRENCY RATIO 129
in service charges on checking accounts and a decline in rates paid
on savings deposits.By 1960 the factors associated solely with the
war had largely disappeared, and the continued high level of the
ratio relative to 1929 may be attributed to service charges, somewhat
lower savings deposit rates despite their rise in the 1950's, and, since
the 1940's, to evasion of income taxes, discussed further below.
FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WARTIME RISE
IN CURRENCY DEMAND
From 1939 to 1945 the currency-expenditures ratio rose 12.0 points.
On the basis of the 1945 volume of consumer expenditures, $14.6
billion of currency was hoarded in that year.8 By comparison, the
rise from 1917 to 1919 was 1.4 points, or about $600 million. (The
British ratio also rose during both world wars.) This section discusses
the rise in U.S. currency holdings during the second war.
Although the 1945 peak in the currency-expenditures ratio may be
somewhat overstated because wartime controls led to illegal consumer
expenditures of various kinds, which our data may in part omit, the
error on this account cannot be large and indeed is probably neg-
ligible.Other factors mentioned for secular movements seem un-
important. Check charges were almost constant during World War
II and rose slowly from 1946 to 1960, contributing to a currency-
expenditures ratio only slightly higher after the war than earlier.
The rate of return on savings deposits fell during the war and rose
thereafter, which possibly explains part of the movement in currency
demand. But the decline in the rate during the war was less than 1
percentage point, and it took more than a decade after the war to rise
by that amount; its earlier movements were far greater (see Appendix
E). The wartime peak in the currency-expenditures ratio therefore
far exceeds effects attributable to deposit rates. Since the ratio declined
8Calculationsof that hoarding according to the currency-money ratio, which
incorporates the offsetting effect of a fall in the velocity of money, put the "excess"
at 810 billion.
That "hoarding" is the right word to describe the excess currency in circulation
is confirmed by the reduced rate of deterioration of large bills.Before the war, $20
bills "normally circulated at a rate several times faster than $100 bills judging by the
rates of return of unfit currency to this bank. Currently, because such a large pro-
portion of 820's apparently are being hoarded, the turnover of the total amount
outstanding is approximately the same as that for the $ 100's" (Monthly Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, July 1948, p. 74).See also Federal Reserve Bulletin, Apr.
1942, pp. 312—316.130 THE CURRENCY RATiO
rapidly after 1945, and large increases in deposit rates came only after
1956, the wartime rise in currency demand appears to involve special
factors which partly disappeared after the war.
The income-money ratio fell during, and rose after, the war. This
no doubt reflected some of the same shifts in asset demand affecting
currency holdings. The currency-money ratio nevertheless followed
the movements in the currency expenditures ratio, but with less
amplitude.
My earlier study reviewed all the factors that seem of possible
importance:black-marketing, travel, changes of residence, foreign
demand, and tax evasion.The first two were dismissed.Black-
marketing did not lead to a rise in the amount outstanding of large-
denomination bills ($20 and up) over what the wartime inflation
induced, as it would have if it had created an important demand for
currency. Total miles traveled per person did not rise during the war;
increased train travel was offset by limitation of automobile use by
gasoline rationing and by restrictions on civilian flights.
The second two factors merit attention.Changes of residence
under the impact of war were unprecedented, and all industries
attracted workers of every type to new plants in southern towns and
cities and to converted plants in the North and West. Many of the
migrants may have been unfamiliar with money substitutes and may
have found currency preferable to checking accounts in strange cities.
Intending to return home at the end of hostilities they may have ac-
cumulated savings in the form of currency from their high wartime
earnings.9If they did, they might have gradually dishoarded their
currency after the war wherever they lived, which would explain
the sharp fall in the ratio after 1946.If so, the increased demand for
currency in the 1940's was not at the expense of deposits, and the
increase produced both the rise in the currency-expenditures ratio
and part of the concurrent decline in the velocity of money.
Another factor was foreign hoarding of U.S. currency.In such
times of inconvertibility and worldwide upheaval, many foreigners
may have picked U.S. currency as the safest refuge for their funds.
One estimate of foreign demand is $4 billion.10This would then
There were of course many attractive alternatives available, in particular, U.S.
savings bonds, their purchase in payroll savings plans being actively encouraged.
Those plans likely siphoned off much of the currency hoarded by migrants.
MonthlyReview, Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., July 1948, p. 75.THE CURRENCY RATIO 131
explain part of the wartime rise in the ratio and also part of its sub-
sequent decline during the 1950's with the return of convertibility
and political
While it seems impossible to say definitely whether changes of resi-
dence and foreign demand alone accounted for the extra currency
outstanding in 1945, by almost any reckoning they seem inadequate.
Even an assumed $4 billion due to foreign demand leaves over
$10 billion of the total $14.6 billion to be explained by changes of
residence—an unreasonably large figure. A rough estimate of migra-
tion between 1940 and 1945 is 5 million people, or at most 2.5 million
families. Savings of $10 billion during the war would mean $4,000 for
the average family, an inordinate, amount for even a five-year period,
when the annual gross earnings of manufacturing workers averaged
less than $2,500 even in 1945.12 And surely not all savings were held
as currency.
By implication, the fifth factor listed—tax evasion—appears to be
important.Some people evade income taxes by making as many
transactions as possible with currency, not reporting currency receipts.
Obviously, evasion will occur on a large scale only if tax rates are high
enough to create an incentive. The only widely levied tax on trans-
actions with high rates is the income tax, though the rates have become
exceptionally high only since the late l930's.For practical reasons
the possibility of evasion by use of currency is limited to professional
and unincorporated business income. An estimate of the unreported
amount of income from this combined source for 1945 is $10 billion.13
If unreported income required a stock of currency equal to one-half
of annual transactions—approximately true of total money balances
in relation to national income—currency demand for this purpose
(not counting currency hoards for storing wealth secretly) would be
$5 billion.Whether this estimate is too high or too low is difficult
to determine.
"Another wartime factor worth a glancing reference was the deterioration of
bank services due to employee shortages. Long queues at tellers' windows during
peak hours led some government agencies and perhaps other employers to pay wages
in currency instead of by check, for the duration.
12Seemy The Demand for Currency, p. 16, for discussion of the figures on migration
and earnings.
13C.Harry Kahn, Business and Professional Income Under the Personal Income Tax,
Princeton for NI3ER, 1964, Table 6. This estimate has been revised downward from
the one cited in The Demand for Currency.132 THE CURRENCY RATIO
Hoarding due to income-tax evasion might therefore account for
what remains unexplained of the wartime rise in the currency-ex-
penditures ratio.Since income taxes have not declined much from
wartime levels, evasion probably accounts for little if any of the sub-
sequent fall in the ratio—assuming that improved enforcement of
taxes or new methods of evading payment have not materially reduced
the use of currency for evasion. Most of the decline in the ratio im-
mediately after the war may therefore be attributed to the disap-
pearance of demand from foreigners and migrants, and most of the
decline thereafter to the rise in deposit rates.
SUMMARY OF SECULAR MOVEMENTS
The secular decline in currency demand in the period preceding
1930 may be explained by myriad developments in pay practices.
No technological revolution occurred in the cost or convenience of
banking services, and presumably at any time in the nation's develop-
ment the public could have had whatever banking facilities it was
willing to pay for.Demand factors seem paramount, among them
geographical expansion; growth of public education;shift to pay-
ment of wages by check; increasing expenditures on consumer durables
requiring large payments and often credit financing;expansion of
use of charge accounts of many types, including credit cards; growth
of various financial means of storing wealth.All these factors might
reduce currency demand. Merely enumerating the possibilities does
not supply a satisfactory explanation, however, since many of them
reflected declining use of currency but did not cause it. Most of them,
moreover, are not independent developments. They reflect or are
related to growth in real income, and this variable serves conveniently
to represent all related factors that on balance reduce currency de-
mand. Similarly, urbanization represents all such factors that became
less important after 1930.It is plausible to attribute the pre-l930
decline in the currency-expenditures ratio to the steady growth in
real income and of urban centers.
Rates of return on savings deposits apparently fell from 1873 to
around the turn of the century, then generally rose until 1930. They were
lower at the end of that period than at the beginning and so cannot
account for the decline in currency demand. They may explain the ac-
celerated decline in the currency-expenditures ratio after 1904, however.THE CURRENCY RATIO 133
The rise in the ratio during the first half of the l930's can be at-
tributed to bank failures and panic; during the second half, to the
introduction of service charges on checking accounts and decline in
savings deposit rates. The continued high level of the ratio in 1939,
compared with 1929, despite the slackening of urbanization and
spread of deposit insurance, is not readily explained in any other
way. That the long-run developments reducing the use of currency
until 1929 suddenly reversed direction during the 1930's is possible
but doubtful.
Hoarding of currency and deposits during World War II absorbed
unprecedented quantities of money and then, after the war, subsided.
People laid away their high wartime earnings, and businesses their
profits, in anticipation of plentiful consumer and producer goods
after the war. Two reasons usually given for hoarding bank deposits
were, first, that many people were not familiar with or distrusted
savings institutions and bonds and, second, that iow rates of return
on assets invested in those ways were extremely unattractive. Whatever
the reason for hoarding demand and time deposits, there was no
parallel reason for hoarding currency. Judged by the subsequent
decline in the currency-expenditures ratio, currency hoarding gradually
disappeared after the war.The wartime rise evidently reflected
temporary factors, of which changes of residence by workers and
foreign hoarding of U.S. currency seem the most important. These
alone were probably inadequate to explain fully the wartime increase
and subsequent decline in currency, and it was suggested that a com-
bination of tax evasion and changes in deposit rates might account
for what remains unexplained. The smaller magnitude of changes in
these factors in World War I would explain why the rise in currency
demand was so much smaller in the first than in the second war.
The wartime rise is fascinating but is important only because its ex-
planation holds the key to interpreting the postwar decline in the
currency-expenditures ratio. The relative importance of the various
factors in the postwar decline is, likewise, relevant to an interpretation
of the pre-1930 downtrend and the future trend of the ratio. The
ratio in 1960, after receding from its wartime peak, had the same level
as in 1939, because the effect of tax evasion and rising check charges had
offset the effect of rising savings deposit rates. The ratio was higher
in 1960 and 1939 than in 1929 apparently because of continuing tax134 THE CURRENCY RATIO
evasion and higher check charges, even though rates on savings
deposits were still somewhat lower in 1960 than in the l920's.
The relatively high levels of the ratio since the 1920's suggest that
the pre-1930 institutional developments reducing currency demand
associated with income growth have not continued. On the other
hand, they may have continued but were offset since 1930 by the
other factors discussed. In that event the downtrend will reappear in
the future unless there are large reductions in savings deposit rates or
increases in check charges.
The post-1930 behavior of the currency-expenditures ratio has
produced similar but smaller movements in the currency-money ratio
because of the income-money ratio. The demands for commercial
bank deposits and for currency shifted in the same directions over this
period, no doubt partly for related reasons, and thus partly canceled
their effects on the currency-money ratio.
2. Cyclical Movements in the Demand for Currency
THE GENERAL PATTERN
Besides strong secular movements, the currency-money ratio also
displays short-run fluctuations.Although not prominent or easy to
identify in the graph of the series in Chart I, those fluctuations were
the proximate source of half the cyclical variation in the rate of change
in the money stock (disregarding the offsetting movements of high-
powered money in part of the post-l918 cycles).The fluctuations
show up clearly in Chart 2 and, as Table 6 indicates, the contribution
of this ratio to cycles in the money series is the most regular found for
the three determinants. Another way to describe its behavior is by
reference cycle patterns.In view of their regularity, cyclical move-
ments in the ratio are adequately summarized by the average reference
cycle patterns plotted in Chart 11.It should be emphasized that these
patterns show the level of the ratio, not its contribution to the rate
of change in the money stock, as in Chart 2.The solid line is an
average for fifteen reference cycles.Atypical reference patterns for
four cycles are excluded: the two war cycles, in which the currency-
money ratio rose for special reasons examined earlier; and the 1927—33
and 1933—38 reference cycles, in which the banking panic of 1933
produced an unusually large rise in the ratio.THE CURRENCY RATIO 135
CHART 11
Average Pattern and Deviations from Trend of the Currency-Money Ratio for Two






15 ponic cind nonponic cycles
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Average Pattern
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Source: Same as for Chart 2 and Table F-i.
Note: The lifteen panic and nonpanic cycles exclude the two war cycles and the
1927—33 and 1933—38 cycles. The ten nonpanic cycles exclude four cycles omitted
from the other pattern and all other panic cycles (see Table 14 for identification of
panic cycles).Stages II, IV,VI,and VIII are based on the post-1908 cycles only.
Trend determined by a straight line connecting stages I and IX.
The average pattern for fifteen cycles levels off relative to its trend
from stage III to stage VII, more clearly shown by the deviations from
trend in the lower panel of the chart. Nearly all the individual ref-
erence cycle patterns have that break in the rate of decline, though
there are differences in amplitude and timing. The typical cycle in
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the currency-money ratio is inverted and, adjusted for trend, has an
expansion phase starting about stage 111 or IV and ending about
stage VII.Without adjustment for trend, the expansion phase is
often only a sidewise movement starting with stage IV or V. (Stages
II, IV, VI, and VIII are not computed for annual data; their standings
in Chart 11 are based on monthly data for the post-1908 cycles only.)
Of the nine nonwar reference cycles covered by our monthly data,
only four have higher levels in stage VII than in stage IV or V, and
all four rise from IV to V. Of the others, most have a monthly rate
of decline lower from IV to V than from Ito IV. The tendency of the
currency-money ratio to decline at a diminishing rate during reference
expansions means that the peak in its contribution to the rate of
change of the money stock occurred long before reference cycle
peaks.
Banking panics, which sharply increase the demand for currency,
do not account for these cyclical fluctuations in the ratio. The dash
lines in Chart 11 show the average pattern and deviations from trend
after excluding all panic cycles (identified later in Table 14). The two
patterns are virtually the same in timing and amplitude. An average
pattern excluding cycles that followed panic cycles (not shown in the
chart) is also the same, indicating that the diminishing rate of decline
in the ratio during reference expansions does not reflect recoveries
from preceding panics. Such episodes usually had little effect on the
patterns, therefore, in part because panics generally did not last long
and the ratio fell rapidly afterward to a normal level, and in part for
other reasons discussed below. By contrast, the 1933 panic, which
forms the dividing trough for the two cycles of the 1930's and affected
the behavior of the ratio to an unusual extent, was the culmination
of an extended period of banking difficulties and, unlike most other
panics, came at the end of the business contraction.It was therefore
excluded.
Since the series in the bottom panel of Chart 11 remove the trend
imperfectly, we should not be overly precise in describing the cyclical
pattern. We may simply say that, even after excluding panics and
their after effects, cycles in the currency ratio have an expansion phase
beginning in the latter part of reference expansions and ending mid-
way through contractions. Whether the ratio is a leading or lagging
series in terms of reference dates is not clear;its behavior may beTHE CURRENCY RATIO 137
described as roughly 90 degrees out of phase.'4It has positive or
inverted conformity depending on whether one views the phasing
as 90 degrees behind or ahead of reference cycles. As suggested in
Chapter 6, there may in fact be a mutual relationship reflecting effects
of business on the money stock together with the effects of money on
business. Since the largest increases in the ratio have usually occurred
from stage V to stage VII, I shall speak of the pattern as inverted.
Important differences between individual cycles can be inferred
from Table 14.It gives the change per month in reference cycle
relatives of each cycle from stage IV or V to stage Vu—the typical
period for which the downward trend is suspended and the currency-
money ratio remains level or rises—and compares it with the change
per month during the preceding and succeeding stages of the reference
cycle. As shown in column 1, the change for that period of suspended
trend was upward in only about half the cycles. Even in cycles without
a rise, however, the decline was usually less than that in the other
stages of the cycle, as shown by the preponderance of positive values
in columns 2 and 3.Moreover, the few negative values in these two
columns are fairly small, indicating that the exceptions to the typical
pattern were moderate in amplitude. Indeed, the largest of the nega-
tive values, that in column 2 for the 1891—94 cycle, is spurious;it
would probably be positive and not an exception if we had monthly
data for that period. That cycle contains the 1893 panic, which pro-
duced the usual sharp rise in the currency-money ratio in June, well
14Tocheck the nature of the relation, first differences in the currency ratio were
plotted on an inverted basis (to show its contribution to rates of change in the money
stock positively) and compared with reference cycles. Cyclical turning points in the
contribution series were selected that match reference turns, first on a negative basis
(that is, peaks in the former with reference troughs, and troughs with peaks) and then
on a positive basis (peaks with peaks, etc.). The period was 1877—1957 excluding
wars, covering 18 reference cycles. In the first comparison, turning points in the first
differences lag reference turns on the average by 2.8 months at reference peaks and
5.6 months at troughs. This comparison views the currency ratio as having positive
lagging conformity to reference cycles. In the second comparison, turning points in
the first differences lead reference turns on the average by 10.5 months at reference
peaks and 11.1 months at troughs. This comparison views the currency ratio as having
inverted leading conformity to reference cycles.
To help identify the dominant relation, standard deviations of the leads and lags
were computed according to each relation. On the first comparison of reference
cycles with first differences inverted, the standard deviation of lags was five months
at reference peaks and thirteen months at troughs. On the second comparison, the
standard deviation of leads was eleven months at both reference peaks and troughs.
This evidence is therefore mixed: for reference peaks, the first basis of comparison
has the more stable timing relation; for reference troughs, the second has.138 THE CURRENCY RATIO
TABLE1L+
Cl-lANGEINTHECURRENCY—M)NEYRATIO WRINGREFERENCE CYCLES, 1879_195L+
a Reference Cycle Dates
Special






or V to VII
Stages IVorV to VU,
Minusthe Change for:
Stages I Stages
to IV or V VII to IX
(1) (2) (3)
ANNUAL DATAC
Mar.'79 Mar.'82May '85 pf —0.1 +0.1 +0.4
May '85 Mar. '87 Apr.'88 0.0 +0.6 —0.1
Apr.'88July'90May '91 p 40.1 +0.4 0.0
1-lay '91 Jan.'93June'94 pf —0.5 —0.6 +0.4
June'94 Dec.'95June'97 —0.1 +0.3 —0.1
June'97 June'99 Dec.'00 +0.4 +0.8 +0.8
Dec.'00Sept. '02 Aug.'04 +0.1 +0.6 40.4
Aug.'04 May '07 June 08 p +0.8 +1.0 +1.4
MONTHLY DATA
June'08 Jan.'10 Jan.'12 —0.3 +1.0 +0.5
Jan.'12 Jan.'13 Dec.'14 p —0.2 —0.4 +0.1
Dec.'14 Aug.'18 Apr.'19 w +1.5 +1.2 +3.6
Apr.'19 Jan.'20Sept. '21 f +0.4 +1.3 +1.2
Sept. '21May '23 July'24 f +0.1 +1.0 +0.8
July'24 Oct.'26 Dec.'27 f —02 +0.3 +0.6
Dec.'27 June'29 Mar.'33 pf 40.4 +0.5 +4.2
Mar.'33 May '37 May '38 +03 +1.2 40.6
May '38 Feb.'45 Oct.'45 w +0.4 —0.2 +0.9
Oct.'45 Nov.'48 Oct.'49 —0.1 +0.3 +0.1
Oct.'49July'53 Aug.'54 —0.1 40.1 +0.4
Average of nonwar cycles:
6 panic cycles






7 other cycles +0.04 +0.66 +0.39
Source:Currency ratio figures same as for Chart 2 and Table F—i.
aSome of the dates have been revised since this table was computed, but the re-
visions would not affect the measures significantly.(Revised reference dates are
used in Table 1.)
bMeaning of symbols:
p —paniccycles, so designated because payments were suspended or Clearing House
loan certificates were issued in New York City.
f —highfailure rate among commercial banks; defined as ratio of bank failures
(Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789—1945, Bureau of the Census, 1949,
Series N—135) to total commercial banks at midyear (ibid., Series N—27, N—45, and
N—47) above 1.5 per cent for any full year of the reference contraction.Before
1892, the ratio pertains to fiscal years and excludes private banks; thereafter, to
calendar years and includes all commercial banks.
wwar cycles.
CSemiannual data 1879-81; monthly data beginning May 1907.
dFigures in parentheses: excluding the 1927—33 cycle.THE CURRENCY RATIO 139
after the date of the reference peak in January 1893. The computed
currency ratio does not show this timing because the data are annual.
The figure for the reference cycle peak is an interpolation of adjacent
June figures. The figure for June 1893, which is high because of the
panic, makes the computed level for stage V higher than the com-
puted level for stage VII. As a result, the computed change from I
to V is positive and from V to VII, negative. Such distortions were
probably unimportant in the other cycles.
All sudden large increases in the currency-money ratio during
peacetime have reflected banking panics, stemming from expectations
that banks might suspend payments. The attempt by the public to
convert deposits into currency at such times produced sharp increases
in the currency ratio. All panics since the Civil War occurred during
reference contractions. Four of them—in 1873, 1893, 1907, and 1933—
involved suspension of payments by the banking system, though in
the first three, banks remained open to handle checks that circulated
through local clearing houses.Further conversions of deposits into
currency were then cut off, except for partial accommodation of im-
portant and needy depositors, and the computed currency-money
ratio understates the desired ratio. Hence, the figures in Table 14 for
the four cycles with suspensions do not fully reflect desired changes
in the currency ratio. For this table and Chart 11, a panic is inter-
preted broadly to include periods of financial stringency which, for
our purposes, can be identified by the issue of loan certificates by the
New York Clearing House to settle interbank payments.'5 The cer-
tificates helped avert suspension by facilitating transfer of deposits
between member banks of the Clearing House. Although the cer-
tificates were issued at the first signs of trouble in the 1873, 1893, and
1907 panics (none were issued in 1933), they did not in those panics
prevent a subsequent suspension of payments.
Panics in which unauthorized note issues circulated to alleviate the
"shortage" of currency had greater increases in the currency-money
ratio than our figures show. There are no official estimates of those
issues, and their amounts have not been included in the time series.
Loancertificates were backed by assets pledged by member banks of the Clearing
House. Except in 1884, clearing houses in other cities also issued certificates when the
New York Clearing House did.In a few unimportant instances certificates were
issued in some cities but not in New York. SeeJ. G. Cannon, Clearing Houses (S. Doc.
491, 61st Cong., 2d sess.), National Monetary Commission, 19(0, Chap. X.140 THE CURRENCY RATIO
In 1893 and 1907, clearing house certificates were printed in small
denominations and paid out to the public. In those two panics as well
as that in 1933, scrip currencies were also issued by manufacturers
and various kinds of "town councils" to facilitate payroll disbursements
and retail trade.All such issues, no less than the suspension of pay-
ments by banks except during legally established state banking holidays,
were illegal, but their legality was not seriously questioned by the
TABLE15
CORRECTION OF CURRENCY—I9DNEY RATIO FOR IZEDNOTE
iSSUES IN PANICS OF 1893, 1907, AND 1933
CurrencyOutside Eanks
($ millions) Currency—Money Ratio
with Unauthorized
Issues Estimated Maximum






















a ,, •1 JohnD. Warner,The Currency Famine of 1893,SQund Currency, Feb. 15, 1895,
p. 8.
bA Andrew, "Substitutes for Cash in the Panic of 1907," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Aug. 1908, p. 515.
CAroughguess from H.P. Willis and J.M. Chapman, The Situation,
New York, 1934, p.35.
publicor government authorities. At least no lawsuits appear to have
been initiated against the offending parties. Yet their amounts were
not insignificant.Table 15 cites rough estimates of the quantity of
unauthorized notes circulated in 1893, 1907, and 1933, and the implied
correction in the currency-money ratio. In terms of the usual cyclical
fluctuations in the ratio, increases of 1 .5 to 2.6 percentage points, as
estimated for those three panics, are extremely large.
On the other hand, the currency-money ratio is overstated by the
treatment of banks that closed rather than just suspended payments
temporarily. The ratio excludes deposits at such banks and includes
their vault cash in currency outside banks. A closed bank may open
again, and even a bankrupt bank eventually makes good on a large
fraction of its deposits.Temporarily, these funds are not available
and, technically speaking, pass out of the money stock.From the
holder's point of view, however, they are not all lost, and he no doubt
counts some fraction of them as still part of his money balances in theTHE CURRENCY RATIO 141
expectation of receiving them some day, even though in the meantime
they cannot be spent. Most such inaccessible deposits were eventually
paid off.Their total quantity was relatively minor in the pre-World
War I panics, simply because failures were not extensive, but it was
certainly not minor in 1933, when a large number of banks remained
closed after the banking holiday until licensed to reopen by federal
authorities, and some never reopened. The deposits of unlicensed
banks in 1933—34 are excluded from the money stock, but not all such
funds should be excluded from what individuals considered to be
their money balances and from the money stock as herein defined,
to which part of those funds were eventually restored. Consequently,
our series for the stock shows a sharp dip in the spring of 1933 and then
rises sharply whereas, if properly adjusted, most of the dip would
disappear. While no attempt to adjust for closed banks in any of the
panic periods has been made, we may guess that the adjustment would
lower the difference between the last two columns in Table 15, though
probably not reverse it or eliminate it entirely.
The only authorized issue of emergency currency occurred in the
1914 panic. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act allowed banks to form national
currency associations and to obtain, for issue with collateral other than
U.S. bonds, notes from the Treasury. The amounts issued in 1914
under that act are recorded in Treasury figures on national bank notes
outstanding and are included in our data. The bulk of them cir-
culated for but a few months16 and had little effect on the pattern of
the currency-money ratio in the 1912—14 reference cycle. That panic,
the only one in which emergency currencies were issued early and
freely, was the mildest and shortest of the lot—no doubt not entirely
a coincidence.
The computed ratios used for Table 14 therefore greatly understate
the panic-induced increases in currency demand.In part for this
reason, the panic cycles are not responsible for the expansion phase
of the ratio, as indicated in Chart 11 and confirmed by the averages
at the bottom of Table 14. The ratio increased on the average very
little more from stage IV or V to stage VII in the six panic cycles than
it did in the other cycles (as shown by column 2) and rose considerably
less in the panic cycles than in the others relative to the decline in the
16See0. M. W. Sprague, "The Crisis of 1914 in the United States," American
Economic Review, Sept. 1915, pp. 522—523.142 THE CURRENCY RATIO
preceding stages (as shown by column 3). To be sure, the rise from
stage IV or V to stage VII relative to the decline in the succeeding
stageswas greater on the average for the panic cycles, but the difference
is cut down considerably when the exceptional rise of the 1927—33
cycle is excluded (as shown by the figures in parentheses). If we could
measure the large increase in the desiredratioduring bank suspensions,
we should no doubt find a larger difference between panic cycles and
all others, though perhaps not by much, since currency hoarding
usually started to decline as soon as banks reopened. In any event,
the expansion phase of the cyclical pattern depicted in Chart 11is
not due to panics.
Nor can that expansion phase be attributed to fear of suspensions
that never occurred or to expectations of increased losses on deposits
through bank failures.If we add to panic cycles those cycles in which
the annual rate of bank failures was especially high, the resulting
averages (second line from the bottom of Table 14) differ little from
the averages for panic cycles alone. There is little relation between
the amplitude of cyclical movements in the ratio and the ability of the
banking system to avoid suspension of payments or large losses on
deposits through default.17
These results, at first sight surprising, can be explained by the
sudden and largely unexpected occurrence of most panics.The
widespread bank failures and panic that characterized some reference
contractions were generally short-lived affairs;they could not im-
mediately lead to large increases in currency hoarding, because with
suspension of payments the public could not obtain currency. More-
over, expectations of future loss probably depend on past experience,
for which the "past" includes considerably more than just the very
recent scene. The total response to a sudden high rate of loss on
deposits appears to be small if the upheaval does not last long.
All financial panics in the past have come after the downturn in
business activity, and financial institutions usually do not show the
strains of a business contraction until it has progressed for some time.
17Thesame conclusion is suggested by the behavior of the total amount of change
in the reference cycle relatives, which disregards the duration of individual cycles
and is not shown in Table 14.For the six panic cycles alone and the ten cycles
grouped together in the next line, the average change in the currency-money ratio
from stage IV or V to stage VII is +0.26 and +0.25, respectively. For the seven
other nonwar cycles, it is even higher, +0.39.THE CURRENCY RATIO 143
The resulting increase in the currency-money ratio may come even
later in the reference contraction if the response to a rise in the rate
of bank failures is delayed. This sequence, however, does not explain
the typical behavior of the currency-money ratio.The ratio dis-
plays a diminishing rate of decline, or even a rise, before the peak
in business activity.It therefore seems most unlikely that public
apprehension about the solvency of banks or increased losses on de-
posits can account for the expansion phase in the ratio, though such
fears might subsequently reinforce the rise in the ratio.
The timing of the rise makes service charges on checking accounts
or rates paid on savings deposits unlikely causes.These fluctuate
little over the typical cycle. Any alterations banks do make in charges
and rates in competing for funds tend to reflect variations in the
interest rates they receive on earning assets (or changes in legal ceil-
ings).Interest rates have generally risen during reference expansions
and usually have not turned down until after the reference peak.
Hence the turning points in charges and rates probably occur much
later than those displayed by the currency-money ratio.
EXPLANATIONS OF CYCLES IN CURRENCY DEMAND
EXAMINED
The Mitchell-Hawirey Theory. The most famous theory of currency
demand comes from the work of Wesley Mitchell and R. G. Hawtrey.18
Their arguments are quite similar and can be summarized together as
follows: Two relationships allegedly work to raise and lower the use
of currency with ups and downs in business activity. First, retail trans-
actions, which use more currency per dollar of payment than other
transactions do, rise relative to total transactions during expansions
lBSeeVs'. C. Mitchell, Business Cycles and Their Causes, Berkeley, 1950, pp. 47—48
and 137—138 (originally published as Part III of his Business Cycles, 1913); and R. G.
Hawtrey, "The Trade Cycle," Readings in Business Cycle Theory, American Economic
Association, pp. 343—344 (originally published in 1926), and Currency and Credit,
4th ed., London, 1950, pp. 20—25 (1st ed., 1919). The importance to Mitchell and
Flawtrcy of a rising use of currency in expansions was that it drains banks of reserves
and thereby eventually contributes to a contraction of bank credit. In their writings,
that contraction has an important role in downturns of business activity. The original
works were published before central banks began as a normal procedure to offset
such drains.
See also F. Lavington, The English Capital Market, London, 1921, pp. 174—175;
and a more recent reference,j. Polak and W. White, "The Effect of Income Expansion
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in business activity and fall during contractions. Second, the relative
income of wage earners (who, it is assumed, spend most of their income
in retail outlets and are the largest users of currency) conforms posi-
tively to business activity and helps to explain the cyclical behavior
of retail trade.
So far as it goes, this theory is consistent with the facts. The evidence
is clear that retail trade prospers more or less directly with the level
of employment, which in turn is a close barometer of business con-
ditions. While neither Mitchell nor Hawtrey had direct evidence on
cycles in the relative income of wage earners, recent research confirms
their hypothesis: wage income tends to rise relative to total income
during reference expansions and to fall during reference contractions,
though the amplitude of variation is quite small and the behavior is
not the same in all cycles.19 This implies that the quantity of currency
rises and falls with business activity. Mitchell observed such behavior
with annual data for the period 1890—1911 in his early study of busi-
ness cycles.20
This argument seems to assume that the ratio of currency to consumer
expenditures is fairly constant over cycles. In fact, however, it is not.
Charts 12 and 13 show nonwar reference cycle patterns of the currency-
expenditures ratio since 1891 and include the 1954—58 cycle not
covered by Chart 11.Chart 12 is based on ratios of annual data.
Where stage III or VII is too short to be computed from annual data,
it is omitted and the line connects adjacent stages. To show the pattern
in more detail, Chart 13 presents nine stages and is based on the
monthly ratio of currency to personal income, which is not available
for a full cycle earlier than 1933—38. This approximates the behavior
of the product of the currency-expenditures ratio and the average
propensity to consume. We might expect this propensity to exhibit
an inverted conformity to reference cycles, in which case the patterns
in Chart 13 would show less tendency to rise before reference peaks
and to fall before troughs than corresponding patterns for the currency-
expenditures ratio show—to some extent apparently true.
In broad outline, the patterns in the two charts have the same shape
as those for the currency-money ratio summarized in Chart 11. The
19DanielCreamer, Personal Income During Business Cycles, Princeton for NBER, 1956,
pp.xvii-xviii.
20Mitchell,Business Cycles (1913), pp.295—300.CHART 13
Nonwar Reference Cycle Patterns of Cur-
rency—Personal Income Ratio, Monthly
Data, 1933—58
Source:Currency outside banks,
same as for Chart12 and Table
F-18; personal income, Department
of Commerce seasonallyadjusted
monthly data.
patterns in Charts 12 and 13 generally fall during reference expansions,
and most of them fall at a slower rate during contractions, or even
rise.This is also true for changes on a per-year basis (not shown),
and so is not a statistical artifact resulting from the combination of a
downward trend and the shorter duration of reference contractions
than of expansions. There is also a tendency for the rate of decline
during expansions to slow down after stage III, though it is far from
uniform and less clear (particularly in Chart 13, as we might expect)
than for the currency-money ratio.
These generalizations are of course rough. The currency-expend-
itures ratio displays several large noncyclical movements which make
its cyclical fluctuations difficult to isolate.In addition, measurement
errors in the year-to-year changes of consumer expenditures further
handicap analysis, particularly for the cycles before 1900, which might
otherwise be revealing because they seem iess distorted by irregular
secular movements. Granted the qualifications, this ratio nevertheless
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seems to account for a substantial part of the cycles in the currency-
money ratio.2'
Secloral ShUis ini1vloney Holdings and Currency Demand. Since the
currency-expenditures ratio is not constant over cycles but indeed
accounts for much of the variation in the currency-money ratio,
Mitchell's and Hawtrey's theory seems unsatisfactory.Yet both
authors discussed the quantity of currency outstanding rather than the
currency-money ratio,22 which makes the full implication of their
theory unclear.Perhaps a better interpretation, which avoids some
of the drawbacks of the preceding one, is that their theory assumes a
redistribution of money holdings between consumers and businesses
over the cycle.If the currency-money ratios maintained by these
sectors differ, as is most likely, the aggregate ratio will vary, even
though the ratio of each sector does not change.Specifically, if the
sector ratios differ by a constant, changes in the aggregate ratio are
proportional to changes in the distribution of money holdings.23
21Thepositive conformity of the income-money ratio to business cycles partly off-
sets the cyclical effect of the currency-expenditures ratio on the currency-money ratio.
22Tolook at the quantity of currency alone can be misleading.Although the
public can maintain any ratio of currency to deposits it wants, since it can exchange
the two freely, it cannot unilaterally hold any quantity of currency it may want. From
the basic identity presented in Chap. 1, we have the following:
C
/ I\ C Jul C=Hjl where
The division of a given quantity of high-powered money between banks and the public
is jointly determined by the two. In the face ofa currency drain, of course, it may take
time for banks to contract credit, and for short periods they may find themselves with
a reserve ratio lower than desired. But large differences between actual and desired
reserves are not likely to exist for long.
Cyclical variations in the reserve ratio have an amplitude 30 per cent larger on the
average than variations in the currency ratio have (based on Table 16, Chap. 5,
arid Table 14). Over half the cyclical fluctuation in the quantity of currency outside
banks, therefore, reflects the behavior of the reserve ratio.
23Theaggregate currency-money ratio may be expressed as follows:
(C\—(C\ (C\ Mb
\MJa =\ +\ M4 Ma
ircirci IC\
wherethe subscript c stands for the consumer sector, b for business, and a for the
aggregate. Hence, if the sector currency ratios remain constant,
— (2.\1
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There are various reasons money holdings might shift among sectors.
Changes in the money stock, from whatever source, are largely chan-
neled through banks and, in the first instance, affect the balances of
borrowers, mainly businesses.Later on, the changes work into the
spending stream and affect consumer balances. With this sequence,
changes in the money stock may cause temporary variations in the
distribution of money holdings (which, of course, have repercussions
on the money stock).Or, alternatively, a redistribution of money
holdings between consumers and businesses may reflect different
responses of the two sectors to business cycles.Business firms may be
more alert than consumers are to profitable uses for funds during
periods of high activity and may act more quickly to take advantage
of them.During periods of slack activity, when opportunities for
investment are poor, firms may have few inducements to keep money
balances low and may allow them to accumulate. Consumers may be
less affected by economic conditions in these matters. To make these
explanations fit the particular timing of the currency-money ratio over
cycles requires introducing some lags at certain points, but such lags
do not seem implausible.
The attempt to determine whether the distribution of money holdings
does in fact fluctuate in a way to explain cycles in the aggregate
currency-money and currency-expenditures ratiosisimpeded by
limited data. The flow-of-funds accounts provide quarterly estimates
on the distribution of money holdings back only to 1952 and annual
estimates back only to 1945. Similar (though not entirely comparable)
estimates are available for the 1930's. That is all, and even these are
far from reliable. The nature of these estimates raises the suspicion
that they may tend to understate cyclical variations. The estimates—
for what they are worth—are presented in Chart 14, which shows the
nonwar reference cycle patterns from 1933 to 1961 of the fraction of
the money stock (including time deposits) held by consumers.
The timing of some of the patterns is similar to that for the currency-
expenditures ratio;however, their amplitude is much too small to
have an important effect on that ratio. To see this, we may apply
the formula of footnote 23. Most of the cyclical movements in Chart
14, abstracting from trend, have an amplitude of at most 2 per cent.
Since the fraction of the money stock held by consumers over the
period covered has been about 60 per cent, the cyclical change in
the fraction has been 2 per cent of 60 or about 1 percentage point. TheTHE CURRENCY RATIO
CHART 14
.Nonwar Reference Cycle Patterns of the
Fraction of the Money Stock Held by the
Consumer Sector, Annual and Quarterly
Data, 1933—61
Source: Flow of Funds/Savings Ac-
counts 1946—60, Suppl. 5, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System,1961,Table 8;andS.
Shapiro, "The Distribution of De-
posits and Currency in the United
States,1929—39,"Journalofthe
American Statistical Association, Decem-
ber 1943, Table II, p. 441. Annual
data to 1951 ;thereafter, quarterly
data seasonally adjusted by NBER.
Note: Stage VII has been omitted
from 1933—38 and 1946—49 cycles.
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maximum difference bctwecn the fraction of money held by consumers
and by all other sectors may be estimated by assuming that the former
holds all currency outstanding. The estimate of the difference for
1960 is 23 percentage points, and it is roughly the same for the other
periods covered.Hence, by the formula, the cyclical movements
produced by changes in distribution have been around one-fourth to
one-half a percentage point. Charts 12 and 13 show that the actual
movements were much larger. The redistribution of money holdings
does not appear, therefore, to account for cycles in the currency-
expenditures ratio.
Permanent Expenditures and Currency Demand. If the fraction of the
money stock held by consumers does in fact fluctuate no more than
the patterns indicate, the currency-expenditures ratio of this sector,
which holds most of the currency outstanding, must account for cycles
in the aggregate ratio.Since none of the usual explanations appears
satisfactory, we may discuss one other possibility.
Since the currency-expenditures ratio might be described as con-
fbrming more or less inversely to reference cycles, its reciprocal—the
velocity of currency—conforms positively, just as the velocity of money
does. Though similar, the patterns are obviously not identical for,
if they were, the ratio of the two would not vary cyclically and would
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timing is that the velocity of currency seems to level off its rate of rise
from stage III to stage V and to rise gently in the final stages of ref-
erence contractions. The velocity of money often levels off in a similar
fashion but not always or typically. The similarity of patterns for the
two velocities suggests the influence of common factors.
What factors affecting the velocity of money might also explain the
velocity of currency? A popular explanation of the velocity of money
is based on movements in interest rates over the cycle.As already
suggested, however, this cannot be applied to the velocity of currency,
because the relevant interest rates—check charges and savings deposit
rates—move too slowly during most cycles.
One interpretation of cycles in the velocity of money proposes that
the demand for money depends on permanent income.24 Conceivably,
the demand for currency depends on "permanent" expenditures.
The meaning of such a dependence would be that the demand for
currency adjusts slowlyto changes in expenditures and wealth.
Then cyclical fluctuations in the ratio of measured expenditures to
currency would be dominated—though not determined—by the
fluctuations in the numerator. This could occur if changes in the
volume of expenditures between cyclical peaks and troughs (in large
part for durables) were mostly handled by checks, so that transactions
made with currency varied much less than total consumer expenditures
did over the cycle, and if adjustments in currency holdings as a store
of wealth were made slowly.
A direct test of this explanation is whether currency outstanding
can be satisfactorily related to permanent consumer expenditures or
wealth, estimated perhaps by a weighted average of past expenditures.
It does seem that a ratio of currency to such a weighted average would
approximate the patterns in Chart 13 after adjustment for trends,
though not perhaps in all details. A definite answer is not at present
possible, however. Much depends on the particular weighting scheme
used, and that cannot be properly estimated because there have been
so few cycles undistorted by steep secular trends or other influences
like panics and wars. With luck, the future will be more sparing with
special influences and give us undistorted cycles in greater abundance,
allowing a better test of this explanation.
24MiltonFriedman, The Demand for Money: Some Theorelical and Empirical Results,
Occasional Paper 68, New York, NBER, 1959.